Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons
Faculty Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2009

Calling your Bluff: How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Adapt
Pleas Bargaining Strategies to Increased Formalization
Deirdre Bowen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Deirdre Bowen, Calling your Bluff: How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Adapt Pleas Bargaining
Strategies to Increased Formalization, 26 JUST. Q. 2 (2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/145

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Seattle University School of
Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

JUSTICE QUARTERLY

VOLUME 26

NUMBER I

(MARCH 2009)

Calling Your Bluff: How
Prosecutors and Defense
Attorneys Adapt Plea Bargaining
Strategies to Increased
Formalization
Deirdre M. Bowen

This ethnographic work examines the inner workings of a highly formalized plea
bargaining unit in a large urban prosecutor's office from the lawyers' point of
view. Observations of forty two plea negotiations between prosecutors and
defense attorneys along with both format and informal interviews reveal how
the legal actors adapt to institutional rules in the pursuit of the both efficiency
and justice. In the face of ever increasing prosecutorial power, defense attorneys find ways to equalize the balance when cases do not fit the "normal
crimes" model. Examination of negotiating strategy and discourse give further
insight into whether prosecutors and defense attorneys behave differently
under highly rationalized systems of plea-bargaining compared with traditional
models previously studied.

Keywords

formalization; defense attorneys; plea bargaining; prosecutors

Introduction
Social scientists and legal scholars have long debated the suitability of pleabargaining as the dominant method for disposing of cases in the criminal justice
system. This debate has lead to a qualified defense of the practice by some
(Bar-Gill Et Ayal, 2006 Goodman Et Porter, 2002; Heumann, 1978; Lee, 2005;
McDonald Et Cramer, 1992; Rosett Et Cressey, 1978; Utz, 1978) while others have
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catled for ptea-bargaining to be abolished (Easterbrook, 1992; Langbein, 1992;
Schuthofer, 1992; Lynch, 2003.) Yet the majority of academics and policymakers
have argued that the system is badly in need of reform (Barkow, 2006; Bordens
E Basset, 1985; Bibas, 2001, 2004; Bohm, 2006; Brown, 2005; Dubber, 1997;
Gorr, 2000; Guidorizzi, 1998; Ma, 2002; Mather, 1979; Zacharias, 1998; Wright Et
Miller, 2002; Stunts, 2004; Wright, 2005). Recent discussion has centered on the
idea that an al[-or-nothing approach is inappropriate, but instead alternative
methods of bargaining may be useful (Bibas, 2001, 2004; Dubber, 1997; Gorr,
2000; Ma, 2002; Schuthofer, 1992; Uvilter, 2000). White reform methods of pleabargaining have been created and studied over the years, it is unclear whether
recent models are an improvement over the traditional models. (See e.g.,
Acevedo, 1995; Schuthofer, 1984.) As yet, no one has completed an ethnographic examination of these approaches. Only Wright and Miller's (2002)
empirical exploration of case screening as an alternative to plea bargaining in
the New Orleans District Attorney's Office comes ctose.
In a review of Fisher's (2003) work on plea bargaining from a prosecutoria
point of view, Bibas (2004c) suggests that the nature of plea bargaining reform
should not focus on creating alternative systems, or eliminating plea bargaining,
or reducing prosecutorial power in plea negotiations, but should instead create
a balance of power by enhancing the power of other legal actors. Bibas (2004c)
agrees with Uvilter's (2000) suggestion that setting the criminal charges and
negotiating pleas should be handled dispassionately and institutionally separatety from the trying of cases. However, Bibas (2004c) also adds that limits
should be placed on the types of plea offers made available.
In this ethnographic work, I concentrate on a rationalized approach to pleabargaining that the Superior Court in Seattle, Washington adopted, a system
which happens to incorporate some of the ideas Bibas (2004c) and Uvitter (2000)
discuss. I examine the organizational structure and background of the Early Plea
Unit (EPU) where non-drug felony plea negotiations take place and explore the
rules, the actors, and their perceptions of this model. I specifically focus on two
questions: (1) whether and how attorneys create a balance of power in the
pursuit of justice; and (2) whether attorneys behave differently under a new,
highly rationalized modet of plea bargaining compared to the models studied
thirty years ago.

Literature Review
Much of the empirical work during the late 1960s and early 1970s led to severe
criticisms of plea bargaining. The social science academic community shifted its
attitude toward plea bargaining by the late 1970s (Brereton, 1981.) Soon after
this shift in attitude, empirical work in plea bargaining steadily dropped off.
Criticisms and suggested reforms of plea bargaining, however, have remained a
popular topic for commentary in the legal literature in particular (Barkow, 2006;
Bibas, 2004; Bohm, 2006; Brown, 2005; Colquitt, 2001; Ma, 2002; Perschbacher
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Et Bassett, 2004; Stunts, 2004; Uviller, 2000; Wright, 2005; Wright Et Miller,
2002). Yet, two problems exist in relying on this empirical work.
First, while the empirical work used to support the legal debate over plea
bargaining was ground breaking in providing a first-time view of how the process
worked, who the players were, how the system came to exist and its effect on
the criminal justice system, it is now almost thirty years old (Alschuler, 1968;
Blumberg, 1967; Heumann, 1978; Jacob, 1978; Jones, 1979; Miller Et McDonald,
1978; Rubenstein Et White, 1979.) Second, with the exception of Emmelman
(1996), Heumann (1978), Mather (1979), Maynard (1983), and Utz (1978), much
of the research in this area uses data collected from criminal files rather than
observing the legal actors and the negotiating process first hand. An informed
debate on the status of plea bargaining as it now occurs in the criminal justice
system requires updated ethnographic work on the process of negotiations.
More recently, the legal and policy debate over plea bargaining has narrowed
its focus to prosecutorial power within the criminal justice system. This shift in
focus occurred both in the Supreme Court's observation in Bordenkircher v.
Hayes (1978) as well as in the literature. The Court became increasingly
concerned about the prosecutor's power to threaten more severe punishment or
charges in retaliation for a defendant's rejection of a plea in favor of a trial.
Specifically, as legislatures have responded to the public's call to get tough on
crime measures by increasing prosecutorial powers, legal scholars have
increased their criticisms over the use of these prosecutorial tools (Barkow,
2006; Bibas, 2004a; Stunts, 2004).
A division exists on how to respond to these plea bargaining criticisms. One
camp advocates an outright ban on plea bargaining while the other suggests
reform of a system that it is here to stay. One such reform idea calls for a
restructuring of the prosecutorial office from within. Uviller (2000) advocates
for a three tiered prosecutorial approach to case disposition. This approach
would address the concerns for achieving justice in an adversarial model of
unbalanced power. He suggests that a case should be processed in a bifurcated
manner. The investigation, where the appropriate charge is identified, and
adjudication, where the appropriate punishment in exchange for a guilty plea is
meted out, should occur in a neutral fashion with a dispassionate prosecutor
who is not responsible for trying the case (1695: 2000.) Only if and when the
negotiations fall apart should a prosecutor take on a zealous advocacy role.
Wright and Miller (2002) propose a model akin to Uviller's (2000) approach,
but place more emphasis on case screening resources as opposed to neutrality.
The intended effect is to reduce the need for plea bargaining. Indeed, the
results of their analysis demonstrated that plea bargains by charge or sentence
reduction decreased substantially when prosecutors screened cases more effectively. Bibas (2004a) builds on these ideas by arguing that the best reforms will
come from building a system of checks and balances that constrain prosecutorial power and have the effect of increasing defense attorneys' power (Bibas,
2004b). Prosecutors should focus on filing only the most serious and provable
charges, stop charge bargaining, write down all plea offers, and get approval for
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them from a supervisor. And more generally, Ma (2002) advocates that the
United States follow a continental model of plea bargaining as found in France,
Germany and Italy. Again the emphasis is on restricting prosecutorial power by
increasing control and supervision.
All of these writers stress that plea bargaining under an imbalanced system
does not achieve justice, much less arrive at something akin to empirical or
legal truth. While the criticisms and suggested reforms of plea bargaining have
remained relatively consistent, the nature of the plea bargaining process in the
current criminal justice system has not. Changes in legal careers (increased
professionalization and specialization), in criminal law (specifically, criminal
legislation such as sentencing reform and sentence enhancements), in political
movements (like victims' rights) and in the overt organization and institutionalization of plea bargaining have occurred in the past three decades. In essence,
the "iron cage" of rationality that Weber (1968) predicted would emerge in
modern society took a particular stronghold in the criminal justice system.
Ritzer's (1993) work on McDonaldization of society, inspired by Weber's (1968)
thoughts on "formal rationality," can be effectively applied to the institutionalization of plea bargaining. Specifically, institutionalized plea bargaining embodies the criminal justice system's desire to create efficiency, calculability,
predictability and control' in the processing of defendants (Ritzer, 1993.)
Wright and Miller (2002) observe that empirical studies have ignored the
inner workings of justice agencies and what values emerge in the production of
justice. Yet, understanding the culture of these agencies within the context of
these new approaches to plea bargaining is essential to developing policies
around case processing reforms. As Mather (1979) observed almost 30 years ago,
to understand the process of "sorting cases" that legal actors engage in, it is
essential to describe the court behavior.
In this work, I examine an approach to plea bargaining that adopts some of
the ideas suggested by Bibas (2004c) and Uviller (2000) at the King County Prosecutor's Office in Seattle Washington. The King County Prosecutor's Office
created the Early Plea Unit (EPU) originally in 1990 to increase efficiency in
processing cases. The Prosecutor's Office revised the EPU again in 1999 to incorporate a highly rationalized process of negotiation that exists independently
from the Trial Unit. This particular organizational approach happens to follow a
lot of the recommendations of Uviller (2000) and Bibas (2004c): the charging
and plea negotiating are handled institutionally separately from the trying of
1. These four concepts define the basic scope of the fast food industry. Ritzer (1993) argues these
concepts apply to many of the technological institutions that make up modern industrial society.
Ritzer (1993) was motivated by Weber's (1968) argument that societies while initially benefiting
from increased rationality would soon be taken over by it. Individuals would become alienated and
overcome by the rules and regulations of the institutions in which they exist. In the end, the goals of
coherency, efficiency and predictability would be undermined as the individuals in these social
structures become dehumanized and dispassionate. Shichor (1997) asserts that McDonaldization
exists in the three strikes sentencing policies currently in use in many jurisdictions. He concludes in
his work that these McDonalized policies have fallen the way of Weber's predictions-increased
irrationality (Shichor, 1997.)
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cases; the prosecutor charges conservatively, a supervising attorney reviews
2
each action; and all plea agreements are written down.
While in King County all of the cases are being processed in the same institution, the charging attorney and plea negotiating attorney exist in independent
units from the trial attorney and are not invested in trying the case. Therefore,
according to Uviller (2000), these prosecutors are more Likely to be dispassionate about the case. Only when it reaches the trial team should zealous advocacy
appear. However, a key prosecutorial tool, the trial penalty, is availabte in King
County, which tips the balance of power Bibas (2004c) 3 and Uviler (2000) advocate for. If the defendant declines to accept the offer given at the EPU, she or
he not only faces the possibility of no plea negotiations with the trial prosecutor, or at least no better offer than the EPU offer, the defendant also faces the
threat of additional charges, enhancements, or a recommendation of the high
4
end of the sentencing range if convicted at trial.
In this work, I give a brief history, purpose, and general outline of the procedure of the EPU. I discuss the norms of the unit with particular attention paid to
the bureaucratic rules of the organization, and how the actors adapt to this
increased rationality within the workgroup in order to accomplish their tasks.
Finally, I examine whether the defense attorneys and the EPU prosecutor
perceive this institutionalized separation of case processing as creating a
balance of power. If they do not, I explore whether the actors engage in any
adaptive behavior to create a balance of power. Furthermore, I explore the
more fundamental question of whether the norms and behavior of these actors
operating under this highly rationalized model is different from the traditional
5
models previously studied.

Methods
This study came out of a larger research project examining new systems of plea
bargaining and comparing them to the traditional model of plea negotiations at
the King County Superior Courthouse in Seattle, Washington. I collected data
from three sources in the King County Prosecutor's Office from February
through December 2000. I chose this location for my research because it is one
2. It should be noted, however, that when asked about these changes to the EPU, the prosecutor's
office stated that they were not influenced by any particular academic work on the subject. Rather,
they were motivated by an organic desire to find ways to use their resources more efficiently in the
processing of cases.
3. Bibas argues that attempts to eliminate prosecutorial power are fruitless. He observes "[t]he
more promising possibility is to create a balance of power, by giving other actors more power to
check Line prosecutors." (Bibas, 2004c, p. 1039).
4. The Supreme Court has expressed concern about the use of trial penalties, but has not ruled them
as unconstitutional. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978).
5. I specifically consider the actor interaction studies on plea bargaining conducted by Emmelman
(1996), Feeley (1979), Heumann (1978), Mather (1979), Maynard (1984), Nardulli (1978), and Utz
(1978).

HeinOnline -- 26 Just. Q. 6 2009

PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS ADAPT PLEA BARGAINING

7

of only a handful of jurisdictions that is employing more rationalized and
institutionalized systems of plea bargaining.
The population consisted of the prosecutors and their superiors who were
part of the felony trial team, and the Early Plea Unit (EPU). In addition, private
attorneys and the public defenders from the four corporations that are under
contract with the Public Defender's Office were included in the study. Every
attorney was Caucasian, almost evenly split between mate and female and in
the 30-50 years-of-age range.
Gaining access was a time consuming process. It took approximately a year to
negotiate with the agencies that contract with the public defender's office and
the prosecutor's office to ensure confidentiality of the offenders. Ultimately, it
was up to the defense attorneys as to whether they wished to participate.
During the course of the study only three attorneys declined to have me observe
them negotiate. None of them was private counsel.
Three approaches were used to gather data for this research. First, direct
observation was used to watch attorneys negotiate and process pleas of 42 cases
in the Early Plea Unit. Second, I interviewed a number of times, both formally
and informally, over twenty five attorneys involved in the plea system, and
finally, I collected data on the characteristics and disposition of each case I
observed from court documents, and created a database to both qualitatively
and quantitatively analyze them. These observations occurred over a fivemonth period.
Using an unstandardized interview, I asked the attorneys to reflect on what
they perceived was an important part of the plea bargaining system. In all
cases, I focused the interview on what the attorneys thought about the negotiation process, their opponents, the balance of power, and the organization in
which they worked. These informal interviews lasted anywhere from ten to
thirty minutes, depending on the wait time to get into EPU, and whether additional attorneys showed up, which made some of the attorneys feet selfconscious and want to stop the conversation. The formal interviews occurred in
the attorneys' offices for about forty-five minutes to an hour with a set series of
questions focusing on their demographic background, legal experience, and
debriefing of the cases I had observed them negotiate.
I analyzed the data under the tens of both Bibas' (2004c) and Uviller's (2000)
structural recommendations and projected outcomes of those recommendations.
Specifically, I asked: in a system that adopts the procedures outlined by these
authors, do the actors in the negotiation process perceive an equal playing field?
If not, I looked for strategies employed by the actors to create a balance of power.
In addition, I examined the actors' language, behavior, and relationships to determine if the same concepts articulated in earlier studies around the sorting of
cases into "dead bang" 6 versus "reasonable doubt" 7 exist; if actors engage in
6. Dead bang refers to those cases where both the prosecutor and the defense attorney agree on the
defendant's guilt, the appropriate charge and sentence (Mather 1979.)
7. Reasonable doubt cases are cases where questions of evidence arise making it less ikety that the
prosecutor and defendant can agree on the defendant's guilt, charge or sentence (Mather, 1979.)
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explicit and implicit or consensus negotiations; 8 whether "normal crimes" 9 still
occurred in routine processing; and whether "going rates" 10 were still present
under "theoretical exposure." 11 I also explored the consistency in bargaining
sequence with regard to adding case value by using information control strategies; 12 whether a shared understanding existed around behavior that would be
rewarded or sanctioned in the negotiation process; if the same assessment procedures were used in determining whether to accept a plea offer in terms of
substantive versus formal justice; and finally, whether any new behaviors had
emerged in response to this more rationalized system of negotiation.
This study took place over a limited period of time, examining a finite
number of cases in one urban setting. It is not meant to provide results that are
generalizable to all prosecutors' offices, nor can it, given the unique population
of crimes, criminals, attorneys, judges, and policies found in this particular
jurisdiction. The study is further limited by the narrow focus of the specific
felonies that are handled in the plea bargaining system that I observed. These
are generally class B and C non-violent felonies. However, an important
strength of this study is that it contributes to the very limited knowledge-base
of alternative forms of plea bargaining. It gives insight into the internal workings of one prosecutor's office that has adopted some reform. Finally, this study
allows for a more informed discussion of whether plea bargaining reforms should
13
be enacted and for what purpose.

Results
Bureaucratic Organization of the King County Prosecutor's Office
The King County Prosecutor's Office ("KCPO") is located in the financial district
of downtown Seattle. The Office occupies a number of floors in the King County
8. Maynard (1984) observed that attorneys engage in two types of negotiations. They use explicit
negotiations when they are less likely to be in agreement about the nature of the case. They will
raise particular issues to attempt to establish an agreed upon worth of the case. Alternativety, when
the parties agree on the nature of the charge and appropriate sentence, they will use implicit
bargaining, where charge or sentence is offered up and readily agreed to.
9. Sudnow (1965) identified normal crimes as those routine offenses that prosecutors and defense
attorneys encountered and easily agreed on the appropriate charge and sentence.
10. Going rates refers to the agreed upon appropriate sentence that would be offered in an implicit
bargain. Both Feeley (1979) and Sudnow (1965) observed this phenomenon in their work.
11. Feeley (1979) refers to theoretical exposure as the maximum sentence a defendant could
receive, but rarely does, from all their charges and then treating each sentence consecutively.
Defense attorneys use this technique to demonstrate their own worth and the value of the plea
agreement being offered.
12. Maynard (1984) observed this technique of highlighting or ignoring certain language, evidence,
or characteristics of a case or defendant in the hopes of increasing the value of it. The value refers
to the legal significance of the case. The more complex the defendant or case, the more likely a
better deal can be made using information control.
13. While defendants play a significant rote in the decision to accept a plea or go to trial, their rote
in the process was beyond the scope of this study.
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Superior Court Building. It is the largest prosecutor's office in Washington State.
Over 500 people are employed there, 240 of whom are prosecuting attorneys.
An executive group manages the four divisions that make up the Prosecutor's
Office: Civil Division, Fraud Prevention, Family Support Division and Criminal
Division. The Criminal Division, the largest of the four divisions, has 156 attorneys. It comprises ten highly specialized units, one of which is the EPU.
After an arrest is made and the investigation is complete, the charge is filed
by the King County (KC) Prosecutor's Office. The prosecutor's office has a
specific set of internal guidelines on the rules used in filing charges and
disposing of cases. These guidelines are used by the junior deputy prosecuting
attorneys to assist them in filing the appropriate charges. In general, the guidelines advise that the defendant should be charged only for what can be reasonably proven and that the prosecutor should charge conservatively.
The KC Prosecutor's Office only files charges on the offenses that it is quite
confident it can win at trial. It does not add additional charges just because the
facts may allow for it, and it does not add enhancements. As part of its carrot
and stick approach, the Prosecutor's office encourages defendants to plead
guilty early in the process of disposing of the case because it offers the best
chance of receiving the lowest sentence for the fewest and least serious
offenses. If the defendant decides not to plead guilty, and the case is assigned
to trial, the KC Prosecutor's Office reserves the right to file additional charges
and enhancements based on the facts of the case. Thus, the "stick" part of the
process emerges as the trial penalty.
The philosophy behind this strategy reflects the point made by Feeley (1979)
that defense attorneys assess their skills through their ability to get a reduction
in "theoretical exposure" for their client. According to a senior prosecutor at
the KC Prosecutor's office: "Padding enhancements and overcharging for the
purpose of creating a reason to negotiate creates an unnecessary theatrical
drama where defense attorneys are given to believe that they have legal skills
they don't really possess."
Under the conservative charging approach, the prosecutor's office asserts
that the defense attorney knows exactly what to expect. If their client pleads
14
guilty, then the tow range of the appropriate sentence wilt be recommended.
The defense attorney can advise their client as such, and the case can move
forward without any continuances. Thus, defense attorneys are forced to accept
the offer as-is unless they have truly identified legal challenges or evidentiary
issues that require further attention. If the defendant chooses to not to plead
earlier on, the State will apply the "stick." Additional charges and enhancements are filed in preparation for trial, where both prosecutor and defense
attorney have more time to investigate their legal worthiness.

14. Washington State uses sentencing guidelines for aRt felonies. A sentence range is determined by
looking at two variables on a grid, the defendant's offender score and the offense seriousness [eveL
associated with the criminal charge.
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After the arrest, the charges are set first by less experienced prosecutors in
the Charging Unit. They investigate the case for the purpose of conservatively
identifying only those charges that can be easily proven at trial. An experienced
supervising prosecutor reviews each charge. If the case is a non-drug, nonviolent
class B or C felony, it is then transferred to the Early Plea Unit. The prosecutor's
sole task in EPU is to negotiate a plea for these cases. The pleas are written down
and reviewed by a supervisor. If the case is not successfully negotiated at the
EPU, the case is transferred to a third unit, the Trial Unit. There, it's assigned to
the trial team to prepare for litigation, with clearly defined limitations on plea
offers. Each stage is organizationally separate from the other.

Background and Purpose of the EPU
On its face, the charging guidelines as well as the purpose of the EPU seems to
follow Uviller's (2000) proposal of dispassionate assessment of a case's worthiness for trial. According to the prosecutor, who negotiates within the EPU, it is
to act as a checkpoint. Again, the language mirrors the goals articulated by both
Bibas (2004c) and Uviller (2000): "To protect the process. The objective is to
make sure we've got the right stuff for trial. If the case does not negotiate at
EPU, then I give a heads up to the trial team about a potential issue" (EPU
Prosecutor).
The defense community believes the real goal is efficiency. White their
understanding is that the KCPO created the unit to increase efficiency in the
processing of cases, one defense attorney observed: "They could devote more
resources if they really wanted to negotiate, but I think they are just as happy
to go to trial" (Public Defender).
The Criminal Division Supervising Prosecutor stated in an interview that the
KCPO established the EPU in 1990, indeed, as an efficiency measure. He
observed that a review of cases showed that plenty of negotiations were
occurring between prosecutors and defense attorneys, but the cases were staying in the system too long. The goal was to get cases processed in 30-45 days
instead of 8-10 weeks. The KCPO developed internal standards to improve
consistency, increase fair results, and to create greater access to the prosecutors for negotiations. The EPU, in its current form, emerged in 1999.

Defense Attorneys
With the exception of the three private counsel in the study, all the defense
attorneys were public defenders who worked for one of the four agencies
contracted by the Office of Public Defense. The public defenders are paid
annual salaries fairly comparable to, but somewhat lower than the prosecutors'
salaries. Two of the private counsel in the study charged their clients on an
hourly basis. The third private defender used a two-tiered billing approach. He
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charged a lower fee for resolving a case through a plea negotiation, and then
gave an estimate on a fee if a case were to go to trial.

EPU Case Characteristics
In its present form, the EPU consists of one prosecutor who negotiates all nondrug, non-preassigned (to the trial team) nonviolent felony cases. These cases
are known as mainstream cases. They largely consist of Class C and some Class B
felonies. The supervising prosecutor of the EPU and the Trial Team makes decisions on an ad hoc basis as to whether a case should be preassigned to the trial
team or sent to the EPU. The decision-making process seems to follow the
supervisor's initial assessment as to whether they can be quickly negotiated
based on the legal characteristics of the case, and the personal characteristics
of the individuals involved in the case.

Institutional Rules, Process and Norms of the EPU
The word "unit" is a bit of a misnomer as only one prosecutor negotiates with
at the defense attorneys handling EPU cases. After the arraignment, in theory,
the case is supposed to be plea bargained or set for trial at the case setting
hearing within two weeks. This schedule is rarely followed. Defense attorneys as
well as the EPU prosecutor requested an average of two continuances with each
one lasting two weeks. Sixty percent of the cases seem to take a minimum of 6
weeks to process.
When the defense attorney is assigned the case, they goes to the records
department to request the case file for the EPU. 15 In general, most defense
attorneys don't go to EPU until a day or two before the case setting hearing.
The defense attorney waits outside the EPU prosecutor's office until she's avaitable to discuss the case. 16 Negotiations with the EPU prosecutor can occur over
several weeks. Continuances are used to allow time to examine any issues
raised by the parties. The general issues raised tend to surround the offender
score, 17 whether the charge is supported by the facts, a clarification of the
15. A key indicator that a defense attorney is not a regular member of the workgroup is their ignorance of the rule that they must request the case. They enter the room to start the negotiations
after waiting for some period of time to meet with the EPU prosecutor, and have to leave to go find
the case from the records department.
16. The wait time could be anywhere from ten minutes to over an hour. As the study wore on,
tension increased significantly amongst the defense attorneys over the amount of time they were
required to wait to meet with the EPU prosecutor. At one point, a chart was posted listing the time
each defense attorney had waited. On occasion, the EPU prosecutor came out and made comments
on the sheet.
17. The offender score reflects the number of prior convictions a defendant has. The correlation is
one point for each offense but in certain cases involving repeat sex or drug offenses, the crime can
be assigned three points. The offender score in combination with the level of seriousness of the
current offense wilt determine the defendant's sentencing range.
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facts from witnesses or victims, consultation with the victim, 18 or search and
seizure issues.
The EPU process, as arranged by the institution in its present form, seems
relatively straightforward to the newcomer. The organizational structure of the
system, however, is teeming with frustration for the defense community. It
creates what Utz describes as, "an atmosphere of cooperation under conditions
of organizational conflict." (Utz, 1978, p. 4.)
From the defense attorneys' perspectives, three factors prevent them from
doing their job effectively. First, only one prosecutor is assigned to negotiate
with approximately 50 attorneys who do business with the EPU on a regular
basis. This increases the wait time significantly. In addition, when other defense
attorneys are waiting outside the EPU office, the defense attorneys feet that
the EPU prosecutor shortens their negotiation time and is quick to suggest a
continuance for any issues raised. When defense attorneys are trying to assess
whether a deal is likely, a continuance just creates a delay that must now be
factored into the assessment of whether to pursue a plea. If a deal can't be
made, defense attorneys would like to quickly move on to the trial team.
Continuances come at the expense of their clients, particularly those that are in
pretrial detention. On occasion, the time taken to dispose of their case is longer
than the sentence given. Finally, it is sometimes the case that no one is available to negotiate at all when the EPU prosecutor is absent. Just as likely, the
defense attorneys don't wish to negotiate with the substitute prosecutor
because of the unpredictabitity it brings.
In an interview with a supervising prosecuting attorney, I raised these issues
with him. He responded that the prosecutor's office has limited resources to
work with and that the defense attorneys "all follow a cattle trail. They need to
be more inventive about their practice. Change the way they spend their time."
This interview offers the first hint of organizational tension that exists between
defense attorneys and prosecutors.

Content and Sequence of Bargaining Discourse
Similar to Maynard's (1984) observations, the attorneys in this study engaged in
a bargaining sequence that involved a "proposal" and "position report." In these
negotiations, most defense attorneys enter the bargaining session silently waiting to see what the prosecutor wilt propose. The offer will reveal some level of
information about the prosecutor's view of the case, or as Mather (1979) and
Eisenstein and Jacob (1976) pointed out, the prosecutor's assessed "value" of the
case. The defense attorney views it as an important strategy, similar to
Maynard's (1984) "framing strategy," particularly in cases where they believe no
18. An interview with the EPU prosecutor indicated that consultation with the victim during the EPU
negotiations is paramount. According to the prosecutor, it is vital to keep communication open with
the victim so that they can consent to the plea being offered. It is essential at this stage because a
victim's concerns can be sacrificed at the trial stage, especially if the case falls apart.
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factual or legal points exist to argue on behalf of the defendant. Furthermore,
the reply techniques Maynard (1984) identified in his analysis are used by these
attorneys too, specifically, the uses of utterances to delay a position report.
Defense Attorney:
Prosecutor:
Defense Attorney:
Prosecutor:
Defense Attorney:
Prosecutor:
Defense Attorney:
Prosecutor:
Defense Attorney:
Prosecutor:

Defense Attorney:
Prosecutor:

"Last time we talked I think it was about scoring."
[Defendant's offender score.]
"Yes. We were looking at a 7 or an 8."
"Urn.
"We need check on these felonies in California.... To see if
the crimes are comparable felonies here."
" Huh?"
"We need to check the California code on the conspiracy to
commit a crime."
"What crime?"
"Theft. I don't think the theft is comparable, but the
conspiracy is."
"What happens when the DOC [department of corrections]
doesn't agree with our scoring?"
"We would be witting to drop the theft, but not the
conspiracy. Why don't we get a continuance and you bring
me a copy of the California code next time you come in?"
"If we go to trial, they'll split into two trials as one will be
a misdemeanor."
"If you set for trial, it will give us more time to figure out
the circumstances of the California crimes and increase the
offender score."

In this exchange, the defense attorney uses a number of indirect utterances
to get the prosecutor to define her proposal without giving a clear position
report until the end of the conversation. When the defense attorney does give a
position report that threatens to reject the offer, the prosecutor reminds him to
whose advantage a trial would be. As Maynard (1984) observed, the attorneys
will move to explicit bargaining and use formal justice if "convergence" does
not occur between counsel. In addition, the defense attorney strategically uses
the phrase "our scoring," suggesting the teamwork that should be involved in
solving this issue.
Maynard (1984) also observed that facts and characteristics were not essential
to case disposition, but rather charging and sentencing were the key to case
disposition. Indeed, much of the content in the negotiations revolved around
those ideas. However, both prosecutor and defense attorneys acknowledged that
character could be an important part of the content. As Mather (1979) observed,
defense attorneys use character to add "value" to a case when other factors
cannot be argued. The defense attorneys and the prosecutor both agreed it could
be used effectively, only if done strategically. In this exchange, I asked the EPU
prosecutor under what circumstances she would consider character.
Prosecutor:

"Mental Health issues. Juveniles. Overall, I can't think about
character because where is the dividing line? I let them say their
piece, but I don't care. Is that awful?
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Interviewer:
Prosecutor:

"Can they make their case in the sentencing hearing?"
"Well, yes. Exactly. They can argue it there."

From the defense attorneys' perspective, this was unfair. A key component in
meting out justice was allowing for second chances. Character was a key determinant of that. According to defense counsel, the sentencing hearing seemed to
be an ineffective, if not unpredictable, place to argue character because judges
are so prone to follow the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation. However,
the defense attorneys did use character strategically in their negotiating and
effectively added "value" to their case.
For example, on one occasion the EPU Prosecutor did allow herself to be
swayed by character. In this case, the defendant appeared to be afflicted with
mental health issues. The defendant was arrested and charged with theft after
exiting a store with pants wrapped around his arm. He had not paid for them.
With the intention of cooperating, the defendant had gone back to the store
and photographed himself re-creating the crime. He sent a copy of the pictures
to the prosecutor. When the defense attorney explained his client had mental
health issues and was on medication, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the case.
The key was to use these characteristics in the context of the crime to support
his "position report" to the prosecutor. Maynard (1984) also observed this
strategy in his work.
A significant theme observed in Maynard's (1984) discourse analysis, as well
as in Feeley's (1979) and Mather's (1979) work is that most of the negotiating
involves implicit bargaining. The parties quickly come to an alignment of the
shared value of the case. In this exchange the attorneys view the offense as a
"normal crime" and agree on the "going rate."
Defense Attorney:
Prosecutor:
Defense Attorney:

Prosecutor:
Defense Attorney:
Prosecutor:

Do you have an offer for me on this?"
"A misdemeanor with restitution. Criminal Trespass?"
'This mother is driving me nuts. I'd never make it in Juvy
[Juvenile Court] because of all the whiney mothers. I'd tell
them it's their fault and get fired. So are we thinking along
the same lines? Deferred Sentence? 12 month rec?
Okay, but 20 days in custody and credit for time served.
He'll be out at sentencing.
But you're not doing it out of the goodness of your heart.
Hey, we're going to the game on Friday?
Yeah, but he is still getting the benefit of it.

There is no discussion about the facts of the case. Instead, the end result is
agreed upon in the midst of non-legal discussion. What's also being communicated here is an acknowledgment by the prosecutor that some incarceration
period is included in the offer to justify the time the defendant has already spent
in pretrial detention. When asked about this type of exchange the prosecutor
said, "A lot of times, when I know the attorney well, we just look at each other
and agree on what needs to happen here. I feet like we work together on it. They
know I'm reasonable and going for broke is not a good idea" (EPU Prosecutor).
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This implicit bargaining was consistent with Feeley's (1979) and Mather's
(1979) observations that in these less serious cases substantive justice was more
appealing than formal justice. The challenge was balancing the costs of pretrial
detention. On the one hand, the sentencing range is so small for less serious
felonies that it would have been low risk to go to trial, or at least investigate
potential issues, but the time it would take to investigate and/or get to trial
would mean the defendant often spent more time in detention waiting through
continuances than his sentence would be. Therefore, pretrial detention became
a strong motivator to plea bargain in less serious felony cases. In those cases
where the defendant had spent more time in detention than the sentence
agreed to in the plea bargain, the prosecutor made adjustments to the sentence
offer, as noted in the previous negotiation exchange.

Cooperation Within the Workgroup
Despite the increasing tension around the organizational structure of the EPU,
evidence of cooperation within the workgroup revealed itself in a number of
ways. Overwhelmingly, attorneys took the view that they should work together
to settle on the appropriate charge and punishment. When they did not agree,
they respected each other's position to go to trial, but it often belied defense
attorney resentment at "wasting time with the EPU." Overall though, the attorneys' approaches in interacting with each other suggested a sense of familiarity
and ease that comes from working together regularly over a long period of time.
Cooperation in the workgroup originates from an understanding of what the
two parties are trying to achieve. Both sides know that the court and prosecutor's office endorse plea negotiations to increase the efficiency of case processing. The defense attorneys acknowledged the seemingly objective approach the
EPU prosecutor takes. If the case has problems, it should be investigated. The
EPU prosecutor explained her philosophy this way:
It's a credibility issue. We tend to agree because I see my job as being objective. I advocate for the state, but I must make sure we can make our case. At
the same time, I'm not going to tell them all the issues or hide them all either
because that would mean ineffective assistance of counsel. (EPU Prosecutor)
When defense attorneys questioned the facts, the charge, evidentiary or
scoring issues, the EPU prosecutor always agreed to a continuance to investigate
the case further. She willingly shared resources with the defense counsel and
went so far as to point out potential issues that the defense counsel appeared to
have not picked up on. In addition, when the defense attorney determined that
trying the case was a better strategy, or that a request denied by the prosecutor
would be raised at the sentencing hearing, the EPU prosecutor respected that
position. This example illustrates this behavior.
A defense attorney began negotiations on an assault case questioning
whether the charge of Assault in the third degree was appropriate given the
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facts of the case. The victim was the landlord who shared a house with the
defendant. The victim confronted the defendant about not paying rent as well
as his messy room. A fight ensued in which both parties were arrested, but only
the defendant was charged. When the defense attorney did not elaborate on
why Assault in the fourth degree would have been more appropriate, the EPU
prosecutor handed him the charging standards to review. The defense attorney
asked for help in looking them up. The prosecutor read them aloud. Together,
they listened to the 911 tape and examined the pictures of the injuries in light
of the charging standards. The prosecutor then conceded:
Prosecutor:
Defense Attorney:
Prosecutor:

"It's an assault 4 (then jokes) with the stipulation that the
defendant keep his room clean!"
"Agreed! I do have to check with my client though."
"If the defendant won't agree, just set it for trial."

In this exchange, the parties clearly worked together in the dispassionate
manner Uviller (2000) recommends to find the appropriate charge. The prosecutor agrees to reduce the charge and wants a guilty plea in exchange for the low
end of the sentence range recommendation. All of this is implicit bargaining.
However, the defense attorney is does not readily agree because there is an
unspoken character issue of which both parties are aware. The defense attorney
knows, however, it would be bad strategy to articulate it explicitly. The victim
is gay and the defendant is straight. The attorneys know socially sensitive
characteristics can be problematic for a jury. The defense attorney is testing to
see if there is room for further negotiation by leaving himself room to check
with his client. The prosecutor makes her position clear with the last statement.
The tone of the exchange is pleasant and even includes a joke, but ultimately
the prosecutor has made clear she will not negotiate further.
Reasonableness seemed to have its limits, and similar to Heumann's (1979)
observations about "ungentlemanly" behavior, attorneys who raise frivolous
legal issues that they cannot support are perceived as wasting the prosecutor's
time. In one case, the defense attorney came in for the initial negotiations and
asked for a misdemeanor on an eluding police case. The defense attorney
suggested there was an identification issue, but did not elaborate. The prosecutor disagreed and offered that perhaps there is a search issue instead. She
advised the defense attorney to read the case law, and then they'd ask for a
continuance. The prosecutor even read him the cite to the case. When he
returns with the case law in hand, but does not actually argue the case, defense
counsel's request for a misdemeanor is met with silence. The prosecutor
explained her reaction: "I think we'll lose on the search issue, but it doesn't kill
the case. Yeah, sure, I could have given him reckless endangerment, but I did
not want to do it. Sometimes I'm surprised how unprepared they are. Why not
argue why the case applies?" (EPU Prosecutor).
On the other hand, some defense attorneys asserted that the prosecutor was
not always prepared either, but the defense attorneys claimed that this could be
to their advantage. The defense attorneys entered these types of negotiations
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simply waiting for an offer, rather than arguing the case. On occasion, the
prosecutor would underestimate the value of the case, and the defense counsel
perceived that the EPU prosecutor gave a better offer than the "going rate."
Defense counsel particularly relished these moments because they could go back
to their clients and legitimately argue that the defendant got a discount off their
"theoretical exposure." In other situations, when the offer was too good,
defense counsel took it as a signal that something was wrong with the case and
a better offer could be had if they waited and set it for trial.
Overall, defense attorneys felt that they operated in a subculture of cooperation, in which most cases were readily negotiated because of the shared
knowledge and easy alignment in terms of "normal crimes" and "going rates."
Most defense attorneys thought that the EPU had a place in the judicial system
and that certain types of "no brainer" 19 cases belonged there-victimess crimes
in particular. The defense attorneys found they could work with the EPU prosecutor in a cooperative manner, but certainly under tense circumstances. They
believed that the lack of resources made available suggested that the prosecutor's office did not care about efficiency and fairness. Consistently, the defense
attorneys voiced concern about the time it took to negotiate cases in EPU
because only one prosecutor was assigned to the Unit. Every request to investigate a case further meant a delay in resolving the case.

Decision Making and Adaptation to the Institutional Rules and Process
Despite the perceived impediments of the EPU's organizational system, the
actors within the workgroup almost approached a sense of camaraderie as they
completed their daily tasks. While the defense attorneys tolerated the structural
arrangement of the EPU (less so as the study wore on) eighty percent expressed
deep frustration about two institutional rules of the bargaining process. The first
rule stated that once negotiations failed at the EPU, no negotiations should occur
at the trial level, and if the case absolutely required them, the trial team could
not offer a deal better than what was offered at the EPU. The second rule
declared that negotiations were not available at all if a case bypassed EPU and
immediately set for trial. These rules were viewed as another form of a trial
penalty.
With regard to the first rule, every defense attorney had a story to tell about
the deputy trial team offering a better deal than EPU, only to have it withdrawn

19. When asked to clarify "no brainer" cases, defense attorneys repeatedly mentioned cases where
the facts are straightforward, no evidentiary problems exist, and the offense is not overcharged.
Despite King County's policy of charging conservatively, many defense attorneys felt the least experienced prosecutors who filed the charges were not properly trained. In fact, one deputy trial prosecutor acknowledged that cases sometimes were overcharged. The overall description of "no
brainer" cases seemed to meet the definition of Mather's (1979) "dead bangers" or Sudnow's (1965)
"normal crimes."
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when the trial team discovered that the EPU had made a less attractive offer.
One defense attorney explained it this way:
There's almost an incentive not to submit the case to EPU and set it for trial.
Because sometimes a deal is offered by the trial team and they can't make the
offer because the EPU set a tougher deal. I had a defendant where three cases
were involved. I said, "My guy wilt plead if two are dismissed." EPU said one"
and the trial deputy said "two" and then looked in the file and said, "I can't
because of the policy on EPU offers. It's almost better not to open the can of
worms [at EPU]." (Public Defender)
The defense attorney's comment suggests that he is more confident in the
second rule being broken: the trial team's willingness to negotiate even if the
defense attorneys bypass EPU because the trial prosecutor is facing the pressure
of whether they can win at trial.
The rule that the trial team cannot offer a deal better than the EPU causes
additional angst particularly when the defendant has been in pretrial detention.
While the attorneys negotiate the case at EPU, the defendant spends weeks or
even months in jail only to have the process start all over again with the trial
team. The additional time incarcerated may afford the defendant a better deal
on paper only; overcoming the risks of trial and a more severe sentence could,
in the end lead to a better offer, but the amount of time he spends in jail
waiting for two different prosecutors and his defense attorney to resolve the
case may surpass his actual sentence.
A defense attorney described the problem of the EPU in the following manner:
The problem is that this is a traffic jam. You have to have continuances. I average three or four a case because you need the time to determine if there's a
good defense. You're just shooting from the hip; both of us [prosecutor and
defense attorney] need to get up to speed. Maybe one out of 30-40 cases do I
get a deal on the first try. (Public Defender)
Defense attorneys chose one of two ways to adapt to this situation. Typically,
if the deputy trial attorney refused to negotiate or revised an offer to remain
consistent with the EPU's offer, the defense attorneys approached the supervising trial attorneys.
The defense attorneys who tried this method were usually more senior than
the deputy trial attorneys with whom they were negotiating. Public defenders,
in particular, perceived that they had more success with the supervising prosecutors because of one key factor-history. According to one defense attorney:
I go to the supervisor because I usually have a history with the supervisor. There
is no substitute for history with a person. I'd love to work with someone I've
bonded with in trial. We've bonded through the stress and we know how the
disagreements will fail out. (Public Defender)
The other adaptation employed by about twenty percent of the defense
attorneys was to bypass the EPU and set the case for trial. Although the defense
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attorneys ran the risk of having the trial prosecutor enforce the second rule- no
negotiating, they knew that if the case felt apart or the trial attorney had a full
calendar, a deal could be made. The majority of defense attorneys informed me
that they monitor the deputy trial attorneys' calendars. They deemed it good
strategy to set the case for trial and have a "highly stressed prosecutor call for
a deal."
Over ninety percent of the trial team prosecutors interviewed said that they
would initially enforce the no negotiation rule unless it was a private attorney
unfamiliar with the process. However, every trial team prosecutor thought that
each case should be negotiated, if possible, but some noted that defense
attorneys who bypassed EPU should not receive as good a deal as those that
followed the process. This prosecutor's opinion summarizes most of the trial
team's view:
Even if it's gone through EPU, I basically think the negotiating has to happen.
Every case needs the opportunity to be resolved. I'm not trying to jumpstart a
case, but every case can unravel, witnesses go missing or evidentiary issues
come up. It's a mistake not to listen to the defense attorney. In my last eight or
nine cases, I've given better deals in two or three cases [than EPU.] (Deputy
Trial Attorney)
The defense attorney's engaged in a two-part decision-making analysis, similar
to the approach taken by the attorneys in Emmetman's (1996) work. First, the
defense attorneys assess the value of the case based on the seriousness of
the case, the strength of the evidence, and the background characteristics.
The more serious the case, the more inclined defense counsel was to take it
directly to the trial team and try negotiations there; particularly after engaging in part two of the analysis-the potential costs of delay by setting the case
for trial after going to EPU. The defense attorneys felt that the possibility of
lost witnesses, better defense evidence emerging, and a clogged prosecutor
calendar could all be used in their favor regardless of the risk of a trial
penalty. In the end, the defense attorneys know that these rules are flexible.
A plea bargain is possible with either the EPU or the trial team. Thus, the
defense attorneys felt that they used this knowledge to create a balance of
power.

Organizational Challenges of Having Separate Units Process
the Same Case
Notwithstanding, the defense attorneys found the negotiating process challenging whether it was with the EPU prosecutor or the trial team deputy prosecutors. They felt a truly effective negotiation could not occur if both parties
were not approaching the bargaining with the same level of investment in the
case. The defense attorneys thought that EPU prosecutor was too removed
from the case because she would not actually be trying the case. She was not
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really eyeing the case for trial in the same way a defense attorney was
because the EPU prosecutor was not facing the same consequences of trying
the case if the plea fell through. Consequently, she had less at stake than the
trial attorney.
The following example illustrates this point. In two burglary cases, the defendants had substantial offender scores that significantly increased the lengths of
their sentences. The EPU offers in both of these cases were at the higher end of
the sentencing range because:
There is nothing to lose by going to trial. I offered midrange because I was
appalted by the offender scores. They're off the charts. Sure I could have gone
lower, but I didn't want to. Let trial team deal with it, if they have too. (EPU
Prosecutor)
In this case, there was a shared understanding as to the crime, but no convergence around the sentence length. The defense attorney was frustrated because
he had to begin the negotiation process again with the trial team, under the
guise that the trial team could not offer anything better; yet EPU knew the
defense counsel would try to get a better deal.
In fact, the trial prosecutor offered the minimum range in one of the cases,
as he was unable to get any response from the victim. In the other case, the
trial prosecutor kept the EPU offer open. The defense attorney advised her
client to plead guilty. Ultimately, defense counsel obtained a significantly tower
punishment at the sentencing hearing after describing in detail that the defendant had mental health issues for which he desperately wished to seek treatment. This shows how the defense attorney used the manipulation of his
knowledge of the rules to his advantage at every stage. The trial attorney,
having greater investment in the case, saw the need to plead out the cases.
While discussing characteristics would not influence the EPU prosecutor, or
perhaps even the trial prosecutor, it did impact the judge's sentencing. Only if
both the prosecutor and the defense attorney sign an "agreed" plea, will the
defense attorney not attempt to get a lower sentence at the sentencing
hearing. 20 Regardless, the defense attorney felt the case could have been
processed more efficiently if the EPU prosecutor actually had an investment in
the case going to trial.
While Bibas (2004c) advocated greater supervision of plea agreements,
defense attorneys thought there was too much supervision. Defense counsel felt
that deputy trial prosecutors did not have adequate ownership over their cases.
In comparing the organization of trial prosecutors in another county, one
defense attorney observed: "In Thurston [county], the attorney has ownership
20. Both prosecutors and defense attorneys noted that systematic pressures can influence judges.
For example, if judges were deviating too much from the prosecutors' recommended sentences,
prosecutors would threaten to send more cases to trial. Similarly, if the jail complained of overcrowding, judges would give less pretrial detentions or more diversion sentences, thus reducing the
jail population.
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over the case and they'll review it as if going to trial. They feel better about the
job because they're independent thinkers. Deputy prosecutors here need
approval for everything" (Private Defense Counsel).
In fact, the single biggest improvement that the defense attorneys wanted
was for the deputy prosecutors to have more power over their cases. While the
trial prosecutors examined the case as if going to trial, they did not have the
ultimate say in whether a deal could be accepted. Again, the final decision went
to a supervisor who would not be trying the case.
Furthermore, seventy five percent of defense attorneys bitterly expressed
resentment towards the Prosecutor's Office in general. They could not understand why the institution was so unwilling to devote resources to increase the
efficiency of both defense and prosecutorial tasks in the pursuit for justice.
They felt that too much time was wasted on continuances because the EPU
prosecutor was overwhelmed with cases that needed further investigation. The
defense attorneys in this study were continually under pressure to avoid delays
not only for themselves, but also for their clients in pretrial detention. While
the EPU prosecutor certainly wanted to process cases, she was not facing a trial
calendar pressure point like defense counsel.21 In that sense, for non-"no
brainer" cases, the defense attorneys felt that there was always an unequal
balance of power at the EPU that could not be overcome without bypassing it,
which came with risks.
At the end of the study, one defense attorney was so frustrated by this situation that he was conducting an experiment of his own. He was immediately
setting all of his cases for trial to see if he could obtain better outcomes faster
than in the EPU alone or in an EPU/Trial Team combination because of his
confidence in manipulating the rules to his advantage.

Discussion
This article has examined the internal machinations of a highly rationalized
model of plea bargaining from the legal actors' perspectives. It has sought to
answer three questions under this so-called reform model: (1) Do the behaviors,
norms, and language of the attorneys differ from the more traditional models
studied? (2) Does this institutionally separate model of case processing lead to
the balance of power sought by Bibas (2004c) and Uvitler (2000)? (3) If not, what
adaptations, if any, are made by defense counsel to achieve some balance of
power?
On one level, this model demonstrates an efficient and cooperative model
of plea bargaining for those cases that fit Sudnow's (1965) "normal crimes"
definition. While the structural organization and resource allocation of the
EPU led to tension, the legal actors were able to come to an agreed upon plea
21. Although, it should be noted no defense counsel mentioned their own caseload pressure as a

reason to plea bargain.
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in over 70 percent of the cases that were processed through the EPU.
Essentially, both defenders and prosecutors engage in routinization to efficiently process these cases. White cooperation abounds in the "no brainer"
cases, the adversarial nature of the trial emerges in the EPU when cases don't
fit this model.

Norms, Language, and Behavior
The behaviors and perceptions described here demonstrate that even under this
more rationalized model, the defense attorneys and prosecutors act fundamentally quite similarly to the attorneys studied by Emmelman (1996), Feeley (1979),
Heumann (1978), Mather (1979), and Maynard (1984). The attorneys sort cases in
the same way, relying on shared understandings of "normal crimes" and "going
rates." While the name of the "normal" crimes has changed to "no-brainers,"
these attorneys work under a largely congenial workgroup setting, where a
shared history appears to assist in the bargaining process. The bargaining
sequence and content is remarkably similar to Maynard's (1984) descriptions.
The attorneys engage in the same proposal and position report, with strategic
uses of utterances and silences to delay responses. They use implicit bargaining
for "no brainer" cases and explicit bargaining for more complex cases. The attorneys also engaged in information control. They discuss mostly offender scores
and sentencing more so than charging, but strategically mention character to add
value to their cases when possible to do so. Finally, as Emmelman (1996) and
others before her noted, case pressure does not appear to be a key motivator for
defense attorneys in negotiating their pleas.

Balance of Power
While the norms, behavior, and discourse can appear to be significantly analogous, some key distinctions do emerge in this new setting and serve to decrease
the balance of power in the prosecutor's favor. The EPU model appears to
follow Bibas' (2004c) and Uvilter's (2000) recommendations: separate charging,
negotiating and trial units with differing levels of advocacy and investment in
the case; high level prosecutorial review of charges and pleas; charges conservatively filed and readily provable, with less charge bargaining; and all plea
offers written down. However, this structural model does not create the general
power balance Bibas (2004c) supports. Moreover, despite this structural organization, the EPU does not follow the ideological framework of neutrality as advocated by Uviller (2000). It engages in institutional retaliation through its threat
of trial penalties, its no trial team negotiation if the EPU is bypassed rule, and
its no better offer than the EPU offer rule.
For the majority of cases, defined as no-brainer cases that can be easily
aligned, this model seems to be highly effective, according to prosecutors and
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defense attorneys alike. 22 For the remaining 30 percent of more complex cases,
this model can be troubling. It appears to create even less efficiency, more
strain, and less power for defense attorneys for a number of reasons.
First, the institutional rules around trial penalties and limited negotiation
opportunities with the trial team are quite different from traditional models,
and thus, significantly impact prosecutorial power. Mather (1979) noted that
the defense attorneys in her work may have engaged in conservation of
resources when they pled out the "dead bang" cases. Because the sentencing
range was so narrow, the defense attorneys would have incurred relatively little
risk in taking the case to trial, but chose to negotiate anyway. However, the
attorneys' behavior in this study more closely mirrored the attorneys' motivations in Feeley's (1979) work. The attorneys in this study felt compelled to plea
bargain cases not because of resource conservation, but because of the threat
of a trial penalty. While Feeley (1979) emphasized the present, yet unspoken
nature of the trial penalty in his work, in this study, the trial penalty was a
clearly articulated rule that significantly influenced and frustrated the defense
attorneys. Feeley (1979) wrote of a "theoretical exposure" most defendants in
reality would not encounter. However, the attorneys here knew that the combination of extra charges, enhancements, and a recommended high end of the
sentencing range, along with the length of time required to negotiate with the
EPU followed by the trial attorney, created a real risk in adequately resolving
the case as time wore on.
Second, while delay was a significant tactic employed by defense attorneys in
earlier studies, it seemed to benefit the EPU in this study. Emmetman (1996)
found delay particularly important in the plea bargain decision-making that
attorneys in her work engaged in. The organizational structure and limited EPU
resources in this study, however, meant that defense attorneys could not use
delay as effectively. Because the EPU attorney was not taking the case to trial,
she was not as concerned about a case going stale. Furthermore, the EPU
prosecutor knew that even if the case did go to trial and get stale, the trial
prosecutor was under significant pressure to offer no better deal than what she
had offered. Defense counsel had to continually weigh the amount of time their
clients were spending in pretrial detention against the delays of continuances,
the trial penalty, and the opportunity to negotiate a better deal with the trial
team in spite of the rules prohibiting it.
Furthermore, the lack of resources to actively investigate cases for legal
issues in a timely manner also creates a power disequilibrium. While the supervising prosecutor who preassigns these cases feels that those cases assigned to
22. Perhaps the most troubling observation is the unquestioned emergence of Ritzer's (1993)
McDonatdization into the process of justice production. Neither prosecutors nor defenders seemed
particularly troubled with the idea of increased efficiency in case processing through the use of this
rationalized system of plea bargaining. In fact, as discussed, both parties felt that this type of
model of plea bargaining had a place in the criminal justice system, but only for those cases they
identified as "no brainers" or as Sudnow (1965) defines them, normal crimes. The question remains
whether their judgments in sorting these cases as "no brainers" was, in fact, correct. As a plea
inherently means waiving the right to trial, it is impossible to find out the answer to this question.
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EPU don't have triable issues, it is incumbent on defense counsel to also make
that assessment. The limited resources at EPU result in multiple continuances
and discourage this investigation for all but the most serious cases. The defense
attorneys are put in a less powerful position when they have to consider the EPU
prosecutor's case pressure against their client's pretrial detention. Defense
counsel worried about the ability to property examine the legal issues in the
case at EPU, frustration from the EPU prosecutor if she felt the continuances
and investigation were unwarranted, and then further delays if they felt the
case needed to be set for trial.
Third, differences in negotiation content also restrict defense counsel's
bargaining power. Mather (1979) found that overcharging played a significant
role in negotiation conversations. This was not the case here, as the policy in
this office was to charge conservatively. Instead, more conversations were
around sentencing or offender scores, which directly impact the sentencing
range, rather than charges. In addition, character seemed to be used much
more sparingly in this setting than in prior studies, where it was a key negotiating tactic. Under this organization structure, defense counsel experienced
significant pressure to delay any character discussion until the sentencing
hearing. However, defense attorneys often felt that arguing character at the
sentencing hearing was futile because the judges deferred overwhelmingly to
the prosecutors' recommendations. They asserted that the judge's deference to
the prosecutors' recommendations meant that prosecutors held too much power
in the system. Unlike in Mather's (1979) work prosecutors in this study were not
passive about sentencing.
Finally, an exchange relationship is essential to any negotiation. Both
parties must feet that they are gaining from the bargain. As Maynard (1984)
observed, exchange relationships occur within the constraints of organizational
process. However, in the EPU structural model, it did not feet like an exchange
was taking place. The defense attorneys could negotiate with only one EPU
attorney who may have been too dispassionate in that she had little at stake if
the deal felt through. Either way, the case would leave her desk without her
taking it to trial. The defense attorneys had more at stake and more to gain
from the deal. In that sense, the EPU prosecutor was particularly effective at
calling defense counsels' bluff. This uneven investment in the case led to
tension and suspicion.
Defense attorneys exhibited an undercurrent of distrust towards the EPU
prosecutor. When the prosecutor offered a deal tower than expected, the
defense attorneys were just as likely to take the case to the trial team as when
the deal offered was too high. They suspected that the prosecutor had reduced
the case value because it was a weak case. Again, the perceived uneven investment in the case actually increased the adversarial tone at the EPU. The
defense attorneys did not trust that the EPU prosecutor could be acting in a
reasonable manner for non "no brainer" cases. Thus, by taking the case to the
trial team, the defense attorneys were decreasing efficiency and increasing
risks for their client.
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Feeley (1979) emphasized the exchange process in plea bargaining, in which
personalities and relationships become an essential part of the negotiations.
The attorneys in this study did not find that central to their work at the EPU. As
Weber (1968) predicted, with increased rationalization, the rules take over and
actors become alienated. Under the EPU model, the rules and penalties on plea
bargaining attempted to remove the human element to increase predictability,
efficiency, and fairness. Instead, they appeared to alienate the prosecutor and
disempower the defense community. However, as will be seen in the next
section, defense counsel used relationships and personalities to subvert these
rules and achieve some modicum of justice.

Adaptations
Despite the frustrations articulated about EPU, and in fact, most attorneys
lamented not being able to go straight to trial counsel in the non- "no brainer"
cases, the defense attorneys knew that the rules could be breached. Meaning,
some defense attorneys could equalize the power in the bargain. Specifically,
the use of supervisors cut both ways for the attorneys. On the one hand, the
supervisor may have appeared too dispassionate, even a hindrance, in disallowing the subordinate trial prosecutor's offer, white experienced defense attorneys used supervisors to their advantage. If they had a trial history with the
supervisor, they could often get a better deal than what the less experienced
trial prosecutor was offering them. Relationships, personality, and reputation
were seen as key to their success in this maneuver.
The defense attorneys were also quite adept at acquiring bargaining power
by sidestepping the EPU entirety. They were confident that in certain more serious, complex cases, the closer one got to trial, evidence and toss of witnesses
could be turned to their advantage. In fact, defense counsel and prosecutors
both agreed that they gave better "going rates" the closer the case came to
trial in spite of rules to the contrary. In addition, defense counsel used trial
prosecutors' case pressure to their benefit in exacting deals that weren't
available at EPU or supposed to be available from the trial team. Ultimately,
defense counsel also found highly effective ways to call the prosecutor office's
bluff. However, much of this power was achieved because of the trial experience, history and relationships that existed between defense counsel and trial
prosecutors.

Conclusion
Despite the presence of structural changes advocated for by Bibas (2004c), the
neutrality Uvitler (2000) suggests did not materialize in this reformed model of
plea bargaining. Under the current organization of "reformed" plea bargaining
in this study, efficiency was achieved at the EPU in seventy percent of the
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cases, but it's unclear whether justice was. The structure, resources, and rules
Lent considerable more power to the prosecutors than under the traditional
model. White the attorneys in this study behaved remarkably similar to the
attorneys in traditional models when it came to processing "normal crimes,"
this imbalance in power led to tension and distrust in resolving more complex
cases.
The defense attorneys were under significant pressure to screen cases in the
midst of negotiating and minimizing continuances, particularly for clients in
pretrial detention. In some cases, this may have caused them to treat certain
cases as "no brainer" cases that might have deserved further legal attention.
Under these circumstances, the defense attorneys tended towards substantive
justice over formal justice. In addition, working under the threat of the trial
penalty, no trial team negotiation rules, and further time delays, defense
counsel experienced significant pressure to accept the EPU plea offers.
While those defense attorneys who had relationships and trial history with
supervising prosecutors successfully adapted to the system and achieved some
balance of power with the trial team on more complex cases, this study suggests
that Bibas's (2004c) and Uviller's (2000) recommendations are not enough.
Wright and Miller (2002) demonstrate that better screening is the first step in
fairly and efficiently processing cases. However, more should be done.
First, more resources, should be allocated to Early Plea Units so that both
prosecutor and defense counsel can carefully examine the case for triable issues
without the burden of excessive time delays.
Second, neutrality is more likely to emerge if both parties have the same
level of dispassion around the case. Defense counsel should be assigned to EPU
cases in a similar model to the prosecutor's office. Certain defense counsel
should work only on EPU cases. When both dispassionate parties agree that the
case has a triable issue that can't be pled out, then the case should be assigned
to a new trial team, including a new trial defense counsel and a new trial
prosecutor.
Third, the trial penalty should be removed. While there may be a sentence
discount to provide an incentive in taking a plea, the state should act in good
faith and charge only what it intends to prove at trial and remain consistent
with that charge. If a triable issue emerges, defendants should not be punished
for asserting their Constitutional rights to trial.
The rules prohibiting plea bargaining between trial counsel should be eliminated. As has been shown, these rules can be subverted if a case starts to fall
apart for either party. Furthermore, defense counsel will not bypass the EPU,
nor have the incentive to do so, if they have confidence that counsel on both
sides is dispassionately and efficiently reviewing the case.
Finally, the judges should take an active role in reviewing the sentence. If
character is not an appropriate subject for the plea bargain, it is appropriate at
the sentencing hearing. Judges should take careful note of the recommendation, but also review the presentence report and the evidence presented at the
hearing to ensure the defendant is receiving a fair sentence given all aspects of
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the case. At this stage in this process, the judge is in the best position to ensure
a balance of power in the disposition of the case.
At a minimum, the prosecutor's office should examine its screening procedures for the thirty percent of cases that do not get resolved in the EPU.
Perhaps those types of cases should be immediately assigned to the trial team,
where a more traditional model can be followed. As it stands now, this study
suggests that we have not yet found a reform model of plea bargaining that
addresses the concerns of legal scholars, social scientists, or practitioners.
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